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Lucretius’ symmetry argument is always understood as a simple addition to
Epicurus’ deprivation argument. Both are based on same presuppositions and both are
referring to the state of being dead. However, by closer examination, we can see that they
are using different perspectives. The symmetry argument adopts a first-person
perspective, whereas the deprivation argument adopts a third-person perspective.
According to this difference, it can be further inferred that the symmetry argument
actually provides a very important supplemental argument for the deprivation argument
by trying to bridge the potential gap in the deprivation argument.
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1

Defending Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument against the Fear of Death

Chapter 1 Introduction
In his Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus claims that death is nothing to us by providing
the deprivation argument, which says that “Death is nothing to us. For what has been
dissolved has no sense-experience, and what has no sense-experience is nothing to us.” 1
So the deprivation argument is mainly based on the idea that death cannot deprive us of
anything since it is the privation of sense-experience. To support this claim, he proposes
the existence argument which says that “when we exist, death is not yet present, and
when death is present, then we do not exist. So death is nothing to us.” 2 In other words,
the existence argument points out that there is no subject to be harmed when one is dead.
These two arguments constitute Epicurus’ main reasons against the fear of death. Later,
his follower Lucretius provides a further argument—the symmetry argument—to argue
against the fear of death. The basic idea of the symmetry argument is that post-mortem
non-existence is not fearful because it is relevantly similar to pre-natal non-existence,
and pre-natal non-existence is not fearful. There are many critics of these arguments. My
thesis will focus on the analysis of Lucretius’ symmetry argument and its role in
supporting Epicurus’ deprivation argument. My conclusion is that the symmetry
argument provides a supplemental argument for Epicurus’ deprivation argument.
1

KD 2. Also, the basic idea of the deprivation argument can be found in Epicurus’ claim that “for all good and bad
consists in sense-experience, and death is the privation of sense-experience.” See Ep. Men. 124. All translations of
Epicurus are from Inwood and Gerson (1994).
2
Ep. Men. 124.
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Furthermore, the main objections to the symmetry argument are not convincing because
they can be rebutted by appealing to Epicurus’ and Lucretius’ arguments.
Chapter 2 Different Types of Harm of Death and Fear of Death
Epicurus’ ethics is based on his metaphysics, and his metaphysics is materialistic. For
instance, according to Epicurus and Lucretius, the only things that exist per se are atoms
and void. Both body and soul are made up of atoms, and the soul is a material organ
within the body which is responsible for mental functions. 3 What is more, when death is
coming, the atoms that make up the body and the soul disassemble. 4 Hence, when
Epicureans are asked “what is death”, their only answer is “death is annihilation”. 5 In
other words, death is nothing because there is no existence at all and a subject is
necessary for something to be harmed.
Before any specific analysis of the argument against fear of death, it would be helpful
to examine various meanings of the phrase ‘harm of death’, its difference from the phrase
‘fear of death’ and Epicurus’ possible answers against them. This doesn’t provide
Epicurus’ full argument, but just an introduction to his view on death.
Although there are many interpretations of “harm of death”, it is still possible to
classify them into several categories. The first interpretation is the harm that one will die.
By saying that after death the soul will dissolve and there will be no self at all at that time,
one might think it is harmful because we are mortal and mortality deprives the meaning
3

See DRN 3 161-176. All translations of Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things are from Martin F. Smith (2001).
See DRN 3 425-444.
5
All of the subsequent argument will proceed on the assumption that Epicurus is right that death leads to the
decomposition of the body and the soul and an existing subject is needed for harm.
4

3

of life. When we know that human beings are mortal, some people may assume that
whatever they do, they will finally arrive at the same result—death; hence, life loses its
meaning in the sense that different living processes ultimately lead to the same result.
However, we can also say that it is the mortality that gives life meaning. Just because
human beings are mortal, we should cherish our life and long for accomplishing
something. The Epicureans hold the view that once we acknowledge the correct beliefs
and attitudes about life’s mortality, this sort of harm and fear can be removed from our
life. As Epicurus says:
Hence, a correct knowledge of the fact that death is nothing to us
makes the mortality of life a matter of contentment, not by adding a
limitless time to life but by removing the longing for immortality. 6
The second interpretation is the harm of the process of dying. Some people believe
that there is no afterlife at all but still fear death because it will be painful during the
process of dying. Under most circumstances, people depart because of age, accident, or
disease. People assume that these ways of dying are often painful. Epicureans admit that
there may be pain during the process of dying; however, they think when it is present, the
wise man can still mitigate this sort of pain by learning the correct knowledge about
death and recalling the happiness of life. Epicurus himself is such a wise man. He
peacefully passed away after having suffered for a long time, firm to his own teachings
about tolerating pain. 7
The third interpretation is the harm of being dead, which refers to the status after death.
6
7

Ep. Men. 124.
See D.L. 10.15-16.
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According to Epicurus, a necessary condition on being harmed is that there must be a
subject to endure it. When one is dead, the soul and the body have divided and their
atoms separated. Hence, death has no subject because there is no “me” who still exists to
suffer any harm. The existence condition is not satisfied after death. Therefore, if death is
annihilation, then it is not reasonable to believe that there will be harm of being dead.
And we’ll see later that Lucretius’ symmetry argument actually is concerned with this
category of harm.
Corresponding to these three interpretations of the harm of death, there are three fears
of death—fear that one’s life is mortal, fear of the process of dying and fear of being
dead. 8 Obviously, harm of death and fear of death are different concepts with deep
connections. For instance, it may be reasonable to say that death is not a harm after the
person dies since there is no subject at that time; however, one might still fear death even
if he admits that death is not a harm after he dies. Or, although it is hard to negate the
harm of death during the process of dying, this harm does not necessarily lead to the fear
of the process of dying. If we are told that after death we can go to another world which
is more beautiful and comfortable, then we might even anticipate the process of dying
even if we know it is painful, rather than fear it.
The difference between the harm of death and fear of death relies on their different
essences. Strictly speaking, whether something is harmful or not refers to facts. As a

8

In his book Facing Death, James Warren classifies fear of death into four categories. Other than these three fears, he
adds the fear of premature death. p. 4.
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result, if one accepts the belief that death is annihilation, the belief that there will be any
harm after death will seem ridiculous. At least, if one believes that there will be no
subject after death, further belief in the harm after death would be self-contradictory. 9
Beliefs of fact can sometimes be changed by providing proofs concerning the matter of
fact itself. On the other hand, whether something should be feared or not refers to our
attitudes toward those facts. And attitudes involve emotional significance and value
judgment within themselves. Hence, even if one believes that being dead won’t be
harmful, she might still feel fearful about that status. Since fear is included in our
psychology, appealing only to facts may not mitigate it. Rhetorical language and
persuasion may be helpful to get rid of fear of death. 10
Chapter 3 Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument
When interpreting his master’s argument against fear of death, Lucretius proposes a
supplemental argument, which is called the symmetry argument. In the whole Epicurean
system against fear of death, I think there are at least two levels. The first level focuses
on the question “what does death lead to”, and the Epicurean answer relies on their
physics and atomism. Either death leads to annihilation or a sort of afterlife and Epicurus
thinks that death leads to the former. The soul is wrenched from the body, and those
original atoms begin to recombine randomly. There is no ‘self’ anymore, which is called
by Lucretius “deathless death”. 11 The second level question is that if death is annihilation,
9

But one might still be incapable of eliminating the fear of death even if he knows that death should not be feared.
I think that is why Lucretius’ argument is especially useful in assuaging the fear of death by his poetical style and
emotional language.
11
DRN 3 869.
10
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is it good or bad? Epicurus replies that death is neither good nor bad; it is just
annihilation and nothing. The symmetry argument tries to answer why death is not bad
based on the symmetry between our pre-natal non-existence and post-mortem nonexistence.
As far as I am concerned, there are two places in which Lucretius tries to provide the
symmetry argument. When Lucretius intends to explain why death is nothing to us, he
says:
As in time past we felt no distress when the advancing Punic hosts
were threatening Rome on every side, when the whole earth, rocked
by the terrifying tumult of war, shudderingly quaked beneath the
coasts of high heaven, while the entire human race was doubtful into
whose possession the sovereignty of the land and the sea was
destined to fall; so, when we are no more, when body and soul, upon
whose union our being depends, are divorced, you may be sure that
nothing at all will have the power to affect us or awaken sensation in
us, who shall not then exist—not even if the earth be confounded
with the sea, and the sea with the sky. 12
By referring to the Punic wars, Lucretius tries to show us the fact that we did not fear
ancient periods even if there were important affairs. The reason that we did not feel pain
or distress at those historical affairs is that we did not exist at that time and had no
sensation or experience. Similarly, even if the world will come to an end in the future,
once we cease to exist, we will feel nothing and of course should not fear anything at all.
To further illustrate this similarity, Lucretius then gives us a general argument—the
Symmetry Argument. Lucretius says:
Life is granted to no one for permanent ownership, to all on lease.
Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that
12

DRN 3 831-842.
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elapsed before our birth were nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in
which nature shows us the time to come after our death. Do you see
anything fearful in it? Do you perceive anything grim? Does it not
appear more peaceful than the deepest sleep? 13
This passage, which receives more discussion than the previous passage, is always
viewed as the basic text for the symmetry argument. We can simplify the symmetry
argument into a formal argument:
Premise 1: There is a symmetrical relationship between pre-natal non-existence and
post-mortem non-existence.
Premise 2: The period of pre-natal non-existence is nothing to us (during our life span)
and should not be feared.
Conclusion 1: The period of post-mortem non-existence is also nothing to us (during our
life span) and should not be feared.
Conclusion 2: Death is nothing to us (during our life span) and should not be feared
since death leads to post-mortem non-existence.
In the argument above, Lucretius makes a switchover between post-mortem nonexistence and death. So here in the symmetry argument, he is talking about death in the
sense of the status of after death, or the status of being dead. Obviously, among the
various kinds of fear of death, Lucretius’ symmetry argument focuses on the last one, that
is, the fear of being dead. The status of being dead refers to the eternal time period after
one’s death. And the symmetry argument basically depends on the analogy between this
period and the period before one’s birth.
13

DRN 3 971-976.
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Also we can further change this argument into a modus ponens:
Premise 1: If the period of pre-natal non-existence should not be feared, then the period
of post-mortem non-existence should not be feared. (Based on the similarity between
them)
Premise 2: The period of pre-natal non-existence should not be feared.
Conclusion: The period of post-mortem non-existence should not be feared. 14
This argument now is in a valid deductive form, although there is still a difference
between Lucretius’ words and the first premise in the modus ponens above. The second
premise is quite reasonable. It seems we really do not feel distress about our pre-natal
period, although we still need to justify this attitude. So to prove its soundness, we have
to focus on the truth value of the first premise at first.
Let us see how Lucretius proves the similarity between pre-natal non-existence and
post-mortem non-existence. He implies this similarity with several potential premises.
First of all, both of these two time periods are limitless. Lucretius uses the term
“eternity” to describe the period before our birth. And just like through a mirror, the
period after our death is also eternal. The first passage above can be viewed as a subargument for supporting this premise. Even during the ancient Punic wars, we did not
feel pain or distress. Similarly, when it comes to the future period after our death, we will
not have any feeling including fear. The only time period we reasonably care about
14

In some sense, past events might be fearful, but it is not right to say that we fear past bad events, at least not in the
exactly same way that we fear future events. Sometimes our attitudes toward past bad events can be described as a
feeling of distress. However, when it comes to the issue of past nonexistence and future nonexistence, since it is not
about our experience any more, our attitudes toward them might be similar. I’ll discuss this point specifically later.

9

should be our life span.
Secondly, in both of these two periods, we do not exist and can feel nothing. Therefore,
both of these two time periods are not harmful to us. In the eternal period before our birth,
we were not present and our sensation was not present. We can imagine that at that time,
those atoms that were going to constitute our body and soul were actually the
components of other bodies and hence, there was no self-consciousness. At the same time,
in the everlasting time after our death, we will not exist and our sensation or
consciousness will disappear. This disappearance will last forever as time passes by, even
to the end of this world. As a result, since we did not and will not possess sensation
during our pre-natal non-existence and post-mortem non-existence, we had or will have
no experience, and these two periods cannot harm us in the least.
Based on the first two claims above, thirdly, we should not feel distress or fear toward
either the pre-natal non-existence or the post-mortem non-existence. There is a big gap
here from the claim “something is not harmful” to the claim “something should not be
feared”. Obviously, there is a further presupposition in Lucretius’ symmetry argument.
That is, once something is not harmful, it should not be feared. And this gap from the
claim that something is not harmful to the claim that something should not be feared is
quite hard to bridge. As shown in the first chapter, whether something is harmful is about
facts—whether the post-mortem non-existence is harmful to us based on the
harmlessness of the pre-natal non-existence; whereas something should be feared
concerns on our psychology or the emotional significance of facts—whether we should

10

fear the post-mortem non-existence based on the precondition that we do not fear our
pre-natal non-existence.
In his book Facing Death: Epicurus and his Critics, James Warren differentiates two
ways to interpret Lucretius’ symmetry argument. The first way is that since our pre-natal
non-existence was nothing to us before we were born, our post-mortem non-existence
will be nothing to us after our death based on the similarity between these two time
periods. The second way is that since looking back from within a lifetime, our pre-natal
non-existence is nothing to us in our life time; our post-mortem non-existence is nothing
to us in our life time as well based on the same similarity. 15 Apparently, these two
interpretations are quite different. Their basic difference depends on our perspectives
when considering the symmetry between those two periods.
The first interpretation comes from a third-person perspective, or, an objective
perspective. By saying that death was nothing to us before our birth, it is clear that we are
talking about it from the point of view referring to the time period before our birth;
meanwhile, when we say that death will be nothing to us after our death, it is from the
point of view referring to the time period after our death.
The second interpretation serves a different purpose. It comes from the first-person
perspective, or, a subjective perspective. To say something is harmful or not harmful is
one thing, whereas to say something should be thought to be harmful or not harmful is
another thing. So when we are looking back to the period before our birth and looking
15

Warren (2004) 58-60.
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forward to the period after our death and we consider whether these two time periods
affect us during our lifetime, it is a matter of our mental trouble or emotion.
I agree with James Warren that the first interpretation is compatible with Epicurus’
argument against death. In the existence argument, when Epicurus says that when death
is present, we do not exist, he intends to prove that death will not harm us during the
post-mortem non-existence (because there will be no sensation and no experience). A
similar perspective is used in the deprivation argument. The deprivation argument can be
simply put in this way:
Premise 1: What has been dissolved has no sense-experience.
Premise 2: What has no sense-experience is nothing to us.
Conclusion: Death is nothing to us.
However, it is still dubious whether this sort of argument can really mitigate our fear of
death, or, more specifically, fear of the status of being dead. The reasons Epicurus
provides here can be interpreted as there will be no sense-experience after death and
hence, it will not harm us. No sense-experience and no harm here require a third-person
perspective which refers to a future status. The deprivation argument would be more
consistent if we change it into something like “there will be no sense-experience after
death and there will be no harm after death. Hence, death will be nothing to us”.
However, it seems that Epicurus intends to change our present attitudes toward death by
providing the deprivation argument. Obviously, there is a gap here that weakens the
deprivation argument. Even if we accept the view that death will lead to annihilation and

12

we will have no experience from then on, we can still ask for further justifications to
remove our fear of that status during our lifetime. Surely Epicureans not only want to
prove that death will be nothing to us, but also want to teach people that death should not
be feared. Actually, in the letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus says that “he is a fool who says
that he fears death not because it will be painful when present but because it is painful
when it is still to come.” 16 This important claim shows Epicurus’ effort to move from
mere facts to the justification of our attitudes. It seems he wants to claim that it is
irrational to fear something if it will not be painful when present. However, only adding
this claim is not enough to alter our present attitudes toward death. To persuade people
that death “is” nothing to us during our lifetime, Epicureans have to adopt the firstperson perspective argument.
So the question is whether Lucretius’ symmetry argument adopts a first-person
perspective or a third-person perspective. Or, we can say, whether Lucretius aims to
provide a similar argument to further explain Epicurus’ deprivation argument or he
actually proposes a supplemental argument to fill in blank left by Epicurus. I prefer to
choose the latter answer as Lucretius’ purpose. 17 There are two reasons supporting my
preference.
First of all, as we have already seen in those two passages above, Lucretius adopts
different perspectives. In the first passage, Lucretius uses a similar ‘third’ person
16

Ep. Men, 124.
In “Lucretius on Death and Anxiety”, Segal holds a similar view. As he says: “His (Lucretius’) argument is indirect
and allusive, perhaps because he is aware that he is dealing with a subject generally avoided by the Master…Lucretius
is not necessarily contradicting the teachings of Epicurus. Rather, he is supplementing them.” See Segal (1990) 26-27.
17
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perspective as the deprivation argument when he is talking about whether the ancient
wars were bad for us. So we can understand this passage as an additional premise to
support Epicurus’ argument. However, it has the same problem as the deprivation
argument, that is, even if something was not bad for us, why fearing it now is irrational?
On the other hand, in the second passage, Lucretius uses the term “look back” to start his
symmetry argument. That means he wants his reader to consider the pre-natal nonexistence period from the present time, or, he is asking us to consider our present
attitudes towards those past time. Also, when we talk about the post-mortem nonexistence period, we should look forward to consider it from the present time.
More importantly, right before Lucretius deals with the claim “death is nothing to us”
there is a passage which in my opinion reveals the purpose of the symmetry argument.
Lucretius spends almost one third of the book three of his DRN to explain why death is
nothing to us. However, when we are speculating on his aim in giving the symmetry
argument, we should go back to the paragraph right before line 830:
Besides sharing the diseases of the body, the soul is often visited by
feelings that torment it about the future, fret it with fear, and vex it
with anxious cares, while consciousness of past misdeeds afflicts it
with remorse. Remember also madness and loss of memory—
afflictions peculiar to the mind; remember the back waves of coma
into which it sinks. 18
If by any chance Lucretius is a poet or philosopher with consistency, then it seems to
me that next in text, he should deal with how to resolve these sorts of mental troubles,
how to mitigate the feelings of fear and anxiety in our soul.
18

DRN 3 824-826.
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Therefore, I think that Lucretius’ symmetry argument mainly tries to persuade people
not to feel fear to death from a subjective point of view. As a result, the symmetry
argument should not be viewed as having the same function as Epicurus’ deprivation
argument; rather, it should be viewed as a supplemental argument to fill in a gap that was
not resolved by Epicurus. The role of the symmetry argument in the Epicurean theory of
death is that it provides a very important support for Epicurus’ argument against the fear
of death. Once we understand the symmetry argument in an appropriate way, we will be
able to further understand what Epicurus means by saying the “death is nothing to us”.
After clarifying Lucretius’ intention, let us see whether his effort succeeds or not. Or,
whether the symmetry argument really bridges the gap in Epicurus’ argument? It will be
easier to answer this question after analyzing possible objections to the symmetry
argument and Lucretius’ replies. 19
There are many objections to Lucretius’ symmetry argument. In general, there are two
main kinds of objections. One focuses on the symmetry between the pre-natal nonexistence period and post-mortem non-existence period. The other explores our
psychology, including fear and anxiety and insists that even if we are persuaded that
death is nothing to us, it cannot guarantee that we do not fear it. Thomas Nagel advances
the first kind of objection, and Derek Parfit advances the second kind of objection.

19
Warren thinks that both Epicurus and Lucretius fail despite invoking our present attitudes toward death. However,
according to my analysis above, Lucretius’ symmetry argument intends to invoke such an attitude by adopting a firstperson perspective and later we’ll see this way is successful as well.
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Chapter 4 Nagel’s Objection to the Symmetry Argument and Lucretius’ Possible
Response
Of the two main premises of the symmetry argument, Nagel focuses on the one that
says pre-natal non-existence is symmetrical to post-mortem non-existence. He proposes
two objections to this premise, and these two objections are associated with each other.
One is that pre-natal non-existence doesn’t deprive good from life whereas post-mortem
non-existence does. The other says that it is possible for people to die later but
impossible to be born earlier or later. The second one is a sub-argument for the first one.
And we can generally call Nagel’s objection “the deprivation approach”. Nevertheless, I
find that both of the objections are not convincing since they rely on misinterpretations
of Lucretius’ argument. More specifically, Nagel needs to clarify his concept of personal
identity in order to argue against the symmetry argument.
Nagel answers the question whether it is a bad thing to die in “Death”. 20 His argument
presupposes that death is the permanent end of life. So Nagel actually talks about death
based on the same assumption as Epicurus, that death is annihilation, and there is no
conscious existence during the state of being dead. Also, Nagel mainly talks about death
in the sense of the state of being dead, rather than the process of dying or premature
death. His main conclusion is that we do not object to death merely because it involves
long-term non-existence; rather, death is bad because it deprives us of the good of life. To

20

Nagel, Thomas. 1972. “Death”, in Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1-10.
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support this conclusion, he provides three reasons. 21
First of all, there is a relation between what is good about life and what is bad about
death. According to Nagel, what is good about life depends on our experience and history.
As Nagel claims:
There are elements which, if added to one’s experience, make life
better; there are other elements which, if added to one’s experience,
make life worse. But what remains when these are set aside is not
merely neutral: it is emphatically positive. Therefore life is worth
living even when the bad elements of experience are plentiful, and
the good ones too meager to outweigh the bad ones on their own. The
additional positive weight is supplied by experience itself, rather than
any of its contents. 22
Nevertheless, what is bad about death does not refer to the experience of being dead
or the state of being dead since there will be no subject to experience at all. Rather, this
evil comes from its deprivation of the good of life. One presumption is that there is the
good of life. The good of life does not depend on particular benefits or evils. Life is
worthy even if there are many misfortunes. Being alive is emphatically positive and this
positive property is supplied by experience itself. As Lucretius mentions:
‘Never again,’ mourners says, ‘will your household receive you with
joy; never again will the best of wives welcome your home; never
again will your dear children race for the prize of your first kisses and
touch your heart with pleasure too profound for words… 23
Furthermore, as Nagel says, “most of us would not regard the temporary suspension of
life, even for substantial intervals, as in itself a misfortune.” 24 To illustrate this claim, he
provides a discontinuous existence case. Imagine that one day we can separate our life
21

Nagel (1972) 3-4.
Nagel (1972) 2.
23
DRN 3 894-897.
24
Nagel (1972) 3.
22
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span into several phases, with long periods of suspended animation in between; without
the consideration of desiring to be with friends and family members, many people might
choose or at least would not fear to separate their life time into several phases. Here, the
term “in itself” is quite important. Admittedly, such a discontinuous existence may be
disadvantageous due to the disconnection of one’s social relationships and cultural
background. However, it can be viewed as advantageous in itself simply because life
continues, even if this life continues after the periods of non-existence. 25 So the
temporary suspension of life is not always considered as a tragedy in itself.
Then, Nagel argues for the asymmetry or the difference between pre-natal and
posthumous non-existence:
The time after his death is time of which his death deprives him. It is
time in which, had he not died then, he would be alive. Therefore any
death entails the loss of some life that its victim would have led had
he not died at that or any earlier point. 26
According to Nagel, the post-mortem non-existence time is bad not because it is
everlasting; rather, its badness rests on its deprivation of the good of life. This claim
presupposes three assumptions: death is the permanent end of life, life is in itself good,
and the prolonged life can provide more goods of life. Among these three assumptions,
the first two are consistent with Epicurus’ philosophy. It is the third assumption that is
apparently contradictory to Epicureans’ philosophy since Epicurus thinks that pleasure is

25

As far as the importance of personal identity is concerned, many philosophers prefer to hold that personal identity
requires psychological continuity; some of them also think that persons persist over time by being wholly present.
However, these two requirements are not exactly same. Their difference are presented by some philosophers. See, for
example, Michael C. Rea and David Silver, “Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity”; Trenton Merricks,
“Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity”.
26
Nagel (1972) 7-8.
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limited and extending life cannot guarantee further pleasure. 27
Then, even if we accept that death can deprive us the good of life, how can we make
sure that the pre-natal non-existence time period does not deprive us the good of life? As
Fred Feldman says:
One puzzle that must be confronted is this: if early death is bad for us
because it deprives us of the goods we would have enjoyed if we had
died later, then why isn’t late birth just as bad for us? After all, it
seems to deprive us of the goods we would have enjoyed if we had
been born earlier. 28
If by living longer, we can get more benefits from being alive, then why we cannot
obtain the same result by being born earlier? Although Nagel admits that both of the
prenatal and postmortem non-existence periods are times when we do not exist, he
maintains that the mirror metaphor is wrong. Nagel tries to explain this difference by
saying that:
But we cannot say that the time prior to a man’s birth is time in which
he would have lived had he been born not then but earlier. For aside
from the brief margin permitted by premature labor, he could not
have been born earlier: anyone born substantially earlier than he was
would have been someone else. Therefore, the time prior to his birth
is not time in which his subsequent birth prevents him from living.
His birth, when it occurs, does not entail the loss to him of any life
whatever. 29
According to these relevant paragraphs above, we can put Nagel’s main (chain)
argument against the symmetry argument as follows:
Sub-premise: Anyone born earlier than he was would have been someone else.
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Premise 1 (sub-conclusion): Being born at time t does not deprive one of goods one
would have enjoyed if one had been born earlier than t;
Premise 2: Dying at time t does deprive one of the goods one would have enjoyed if one
had died after t.
Conclusion 1: Pre-natal non-existence and posthumous non-existence are asymmetrical.
Conclusion 2: We should have different attitudes toward pre-natal non-existence and
posthumous non-existence.
For the sub-premise above, Nagel further explains that personal identity relies on the
direction of time. As he says:
Distinct possible lives of a single person can diverge from a common
beginning, but they cannot converge to a common conclusion from
diverse beginnings….Given an identifiable individual, countless
possibilities for his continued existence are imaginable, and we can
clearly conceive of what it would be for him to go on existing
indefinitely. 30
After having a general sense of Nagel’s objection, we can do a comparison between
Nagel and Lucretius on the symmetry argument. Basically, both of them assume that the
period of time before we were born and the period of time after our death are limitless in
time or long enough to have limitless possibilities; both of them assume that people do
not tend to regard the pre-natal period of time as a misfortune. However, unlike Nagel
who thinks that death deprives us the good of life, Lucretius maintains that death is
neither good nor bad and does not deprive us anything at all.
With Nagel’s objection, there are three possible responses that may be made by
30
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Epicureans. The first one is based on the analogy between death and sleep. The second
one comes from the claim that the good of life is limited. The last one is to use the
existence argument itself to reply to Nagel’s argument.
First of all, Epicureans always make the analogy between death and sleep. Since
usually we assume that sleep in a natural way does not deprive us the good of life, we
should not think that death would. 31 As Lucretius says:
At the moment when people jerk themselves out of sleep and gather
themselves together, the primary elements of the spirit scattered
throughout their limbs cannot be straying far from the motions that
produce sensation. It follows that death should be considered to be of
much less concern to us than sleep—that is, if anything can be less
than what we perceive to be nothing. 32
Clearly, people usually do not choose to minimize their sleeping time to increase the
good of life. The state of being asleep is not anything bad for us, and the state of being
dead is not either. Hence, as the deepest sleep, death should not be viewed as the
deprivation of any good of life. Appealing to this reply, Nagel might answer that there is
still a difference between sleep and death. For instance, before we sleep, we know that
we will wake up later and continue to enjoy the good of life. It is just like the
discontinuous existence case. Sometimes even sleeping itself is an instance of the good
of life. On the other hand, before we die, if we assume that death leads to nonexistence
forever, and we know that we can never enjoy the good of life; it is still reasonable for us
to fear it or feel distress about it. However, this reply would conflict with Nagel’s own
31
Some people think that sleep actually deprives us the good of conscious life. If we were not supposed to sleep several
hours each day, we would enjoy more goods of life. However, since sleep in a natural way is required for us to enjoy
the good of life, I prefer not to view this necessary condition for human beings to stay healthy as the deprivation of the
good of life.
32
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argument since this reply assumes that death is a bad thing because death leads to an
everlasting non-existence, which is inconsistent with Nagel’s previous assumption.
Or, Nagel might say that people do not fear sleeping only in the sense that this sleeping
is in a natural and healthy way, i.e., this sleeping does not deprive them of the good of
life. If someone has a medical condition that makes him sleep 20 hours a day, while he
lives the same amount of life time, he could think that this is bad because of the ‘life
time’ it deprives him of. Likewise, if there is a new drug that can provide all benefits of
sleep in a healthy way with much shorter sleeping time, people could think that this is a
good thing because it prolongs our life time. Nevertheless, just as we admit that sleeping
should not be feared if it is in a natural way, we have to admit that death should not be
feared if it is in a natural way. If we accept the precondition that all human beings are
mortal, then facing death which is necessary and natural should not be too difficult. And
even if extending life can produce more pleasure, how long should this extension be? As
James Warren says:
Even those who would wish to accept that death can be a harm since
it robs us of goods which we would otherwise have enjoyed (the
counterfactual account of the harm of death) might shrink from the
claim that death robs us goods located a thousand years in the
future…A more moderate position will concede that death is only a
harm in so far as it robs us of time and goods we could reasonably
have been expected to experience. 33
Even if the good of life can be multiplied and more is better than less, there must be a
reasonable limitation. And this limitation is the natural condition of human beings.
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Suppose that based on the existing medical condition and natural environment, the
average life expectancy of human beings is 70; then death at 70 or later should not be
viewed as a bad thing since it does not deprive the subject any natural life span he is
supposed to possess. In this sense, only the premature death can be viewed as a misery.
Nevertheless, Lucretius’ symmetry argument does not argue for the conclusion that
premature death should not be thought harmful. Again, the symmetry argument only
focuses on the harm of the period after death.
Secondly, whether the good of life can be multiplied is dubious. Nagel presupposes
that we will enjoy more happiness with the extension of our life because we can possess
more of the good of life. To the contrary, although Epicureans regard pleasure as the most
important good of life, as the starting point and the ultimate goal in life, they do not think
pleasure is limitless. In the Principal Doctrines, Epicurus says:
Unlimited time and limited time contain equal amounts of pleasure, if
one measures its limits by reasoning.
The flesh took the limits of pleasure to be unlimited, and only an
unlimited time would have provided it. But the intellect, reasoning
out the goal and limit of the flesh and dissolving the fears of eternity,
provided us with the perfect way of life and had no further need of
unlimited time. 34
So the unlimited time cannot bring any further pleasure. It is not necessary to say that
death can deprive us the good of life since all things are the same and no more pleasure
can be found even if we can prolong our life. The justification for the limit of pleasure
comes from Epicurus’ view on pleasure and pain. According to Epicurus, “the removal of
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all feelings is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever a pleasurable feeling is
present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of
distress.” 35 Hence, as Stephen Rosenbaum says in “Epicurus on pleasure and the
complete life”:
Taking the removal of all disease to be the limit of the magnitude of
complete health, one can understand how a person’s complete health
cannot be increased by occurring for a longer time. It is as great as it
can be at all times a person has it. Analogously, if the absence of pain
is katastematic pleasure, then Epicurus apparently thought that
pleasure is an occurrent state such that either one is in the state or one
is not. One either has reached the limit of pleasure or one has not.
One either has pain or one does not. Therefore a life full of such
pleasure will be like a life full of complete health. A total pleasant life
could not be more pleasant, however long its extent. 36
So living a long life is not a necessary condition for living a pleasant life. Also,
Epicureans might say that the desire for the extension of life is not natural at all. So to
guarantee the validity of his argument, Nagel has to provide further reasons for his third
premise which says that the good of life can be multiplied and more is better than less.
Thirdly, Nagel’s objection fails to defeat Epicurus’ existence argument. We can still
ask “If death deprives us anything, when and to whom is it a misfortune?” When alive,
death is not present, so how death can deprive us the good of life? Meanwhile, when
dead, we do not exist; so to whom does death deprive the good of life? Nagel himself
addresses this objection. To answer how the evil of death can be assigned to a subject,
Nagel maintains that “most good and ill fortune has as its subject a person identified by
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his history and his possibilities, rather than merely by his categorical state of the
moment.” 37 For instance, one would not feel bad if he does not know he is betrayed by
his friends. However, betrayal is still evil; otherwise it is hard for us to explain why the
discovery of betrayal is a misfortune. So the evil of something to a person is not always
connected with his experiential state. However, this account does not provide sufficient
reason to believe that death is evil even if there is no subject when being dead. On the
one hand, in the betrayal case, although the person does not know the betrayal, there is
always the possibility of him to be aware of the fact; however, in the death case, the
possibility of awareness has been removed by the permanent non-existence. On the other
hand, if death can deprive any subject the good of life, the same reason can be applied to
the prenatal non-existence as well. To answer this, Nagel proposes his own concept of
personhood.
Back to Nagel’s objection, it seems to me that Nagel actually implies that the time of a
person’s birth is a necessary condition for him to be himself, that is, to constitute his
personal identity. The issue of personal identity concerns various related problems. For
instance, what is the necessary condition for some being to be a person; what guarantees
one the unique person one is; what makes one’s identity persist over time; etc. The
possible conditions that must be satisfied to be the same person involve the physical body,
consciousness, psychological experiences and so on. The question is if Nagel assumes
that the time of one’s birth is necessary for his personal identity, how could he deny that
37

Nagel (1972) 5.

25

the time of one’s death is also necessary for his personal identity? Let us suppose John
actually lived from the period 1930—1990. For Nagel, if John were born in 1920 and
died in 1990, even if he had same psychology and experience, it was actually not John
but someone else. However, if John were still born in 1930 but died in 2000, then this
time he is still the same John with a longer life and more pleasure. The reason provided
by Nagel is that time is determined to go from past to future and hence, the same
beginning can lead to different possibilities whereas different beginnings can never come
to the same ending point. However, one can still continue to ask that why different
beginnings cannot guarantee personal identity or why the same beginning with different
ending points can guarantee personal identity. Nagel needs to provide further reason to
support his claim that a person born earlier than in fact he was would be a different
person.
In the article “death and deprivation; or, why Lucretius’ symmetry argument fails”,
Frederik Kaufman provides another definition for personal identity to argue against the
symmetry argument based on the deprivation account. Kaufman disagrees with Nagel
that time of birth is a necessary condition for personal identity. According to Kaufman,
there are two ways to define personhood—bodily considerations and psychological
considerations. It is the latter that determines personal identity, whereas the time of birth
is connected with bodily consideration. So he thinks that birth is irrelevant to the issue at
hand. As he proposes:
The features of personhood which most concern us are not captured by
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genetic or bodily considerations or time or birth; hence, showing that
a birth or a fertilization or a bodily constitution could have occurred
earlier does not show that, in the relevant sense, the same person
could have existed earlier.
It is in virtue of psychological connectedness to the events of our
lives that we construct a sense of ourselves as ourselves, and
psychological continuity is what most concerns us when we
deliberate about whether or not we could have lived at different
times or different places; and the prospect of psychological
extinction is surely what disturbs us when we think about death. 38
This view is compatible with Lucretius’ reasoning that the recollection of our atoms
cannot compose the same person with the interruption of the consciousness. Lucretius
says:
Even supposing that the mind and the spirit retain their power of
sensation after they have been wrenched from our body, it is nothing
to us, whose being is dependent upon the conjunction and marriage
of body and soul. Furthermore, if in course of time all our
component atoms should be reassembled after our death and
restored again to their present positions, so that the light of life was
given to us a second time, even that eventuality would not affect us
in the least, once there had been a break in the chain of
consciousness. 39
Obviously, for Lucretius, his definition for personal identity involves at least two
conditions—the combination of body and soul and the continuity of consciousness.
However, Kaufman maintains that it is impossible for a person in the psychological
sense to exist earlier but possible to exist longer. His reason is that to guarantee personal
identity, psychological continuity must be satisfied. If in the psychological sense a person
can exist earlier than he actually did, “a psychological continuum which, by hypothesis,
starts earlier, would be a sufficiently different set of memories and experiences, and
38
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hence be a different psychological self.” 40 However, when it comes to the issue of longer
existence, Kaufman thinks the psychological continuity will not be disconnected. “In
imaginatively extending a psychological continuum beyond the point at which it was in
fact extinguished, we do not have to disrupt the previous contents of the continuum; we
simply make additions to it.” 41 According to Kaufman, it is psychological continuum that
determines the continuity of personhood. And he insists that existing earlier would
disrupt this continuum whereas existing later will not. However, Kaufman does not
explicitly point out what determines ‘psychological continuum’. Is it the beginning of the
psychology or some sort of continuity? If existing earlier can disrupt the psychological
continuity, why cannot existing longer? Of course we can imagine different possibilities
in one’s extending life than in fact it was, but what if there is an essential change in his
psychology? For instance, John is supposed to die at 60, and he is well known for his
kindness and generosity. Now imagine metaphysically his life can be extended to 70. In
this additional 10 years, John suffers some disasters and becomes malicious and brutal.
Can we maintain that this John in his extending life is the same person? At least, it is
obvious that Kaufman’s claim that extending life in the psychological sense is simply
making additions to it requires further justification.
Let us see another way to argue against the symmetry argument. This kind of objection
is represented by Derek Parfit, and it is based on the justification of our psychological
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attitudes toward the past and the future.
Chapter 5 Parfit’s Objection to the Symmetry Argument and Lucretius’ Possible
Response
As already mentioned previously, harm of death and fear of death are two different
affairs. The former refers to a factual state whereas the latter refers to our psychology.
Hence, it might be rational to fear death even if we accept the thesis that death is not
harmful to us both when alive and after death. However, if Epicurus and Lucretius are
right, if the prenatal non-existence and the posthumous non-existence are symmetrical,
Lucretius’ suggestion that we should adjust our attitudes toward death should be viewed
as rational. 42 Although it is still possible that psychologically we cannot remove our fear
of death, but given the correctness of the symmetry argument, this fear loses its
foundation, or using Kaufman’s words “if Epicurus and Lucretius are correct, we should
treat the fear of death as a silly phobia—hard to deal with but lacking justification.” 43
In his book “Reasons and Persons”, Derek Parfit tries to justify our different attitudes
toward the past and the future, and this justification is often used to prove the asymmetry
between our pre-natal non-existence and our post-mortem non-existence. Parfit provides
a case which he calls “my past and future operations”. In this case, there is a kind of
operation which is set up to be painful and performed without the use of anesthetic.
Further, because the suffering is too severe, the patients’ memories about this are
42
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admit that it is rational to fear the pain at the instant of death. In the Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus says that “he is a
fool who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when present but because it is painful when it is still to
come.” So it is still reasonable to fear death on the ground that there will be pain during the process of dying.
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removed after the operation by some drug. Suppose there are two patients A and B. A
wakes up in the hospital and finds out he has no memory about the last few hours. So he
asks the nurse whether he has already had the operation. The nurse only knows that A is
one of two patients but cannot tell which one has already finished the operation. Assume
that A already suffered the operation for 10 hours, and B is going to undergo a shorter
operation later. Parfit insists that person A would rather choose to be the guy who already
suffered the operation even if he knows that this one was a much more horrible one. 44
According to this preference, Parfit concludes that between great pain in the past and
light pain in the future, we prefer to choose that our pain is in the past even if it is greater.
So Parfit’s case mainly deals with the asymmetry between our attitudes toward the past
and the future. The structure of this kind of objection is like this: since, psychologically,
human beings have different attitudes toward the past and the future, it is rational to hold
that there is asymmetrical relationship between the past and the future; hence, Lucretius’
symmetry argument is unsound because one of its premise holds that the pre-natal nonexistence time period is relevantly similar to the post-mortem non-existence time period.
However, this argument is also not strong enough to defeat the symmetry argument.
Firstly, Parfit implies that most people prefer to choose misfortunes in their past rather
than in their future. But this is not always the case. For instance, Rosenbaum thinks that
the loss of one’s reputation can be viewed as a counterexample. Most people would
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choose the loss of reputation in their future rather than in their past. 45 The difference
between Parfit’s case and Rosenbaum’s case is that surgery pain is temporary whereas
the loss of reputation has a further effect that reaches into the future. So the relationship
between our preference and our emotion are not as easy as Parfit proposes.
Secondly, there is a difference between the past or future experience and past or future
non-existence. The claim that we have different attitudes toward past and future suffering
cannot be equated to the claim that we have different attitudes toward the pre-natal nonexistence and the post-mortem non-existence. In Parfit’s case, the patient’s different
attitudes toward the past and the future refer to his experience. He must suffer the pain
either in the past or in the future. In other words, the past and the future experiences are
relevant to the benefit of the person at issue. On the other hand, Epicureans can reply that
our pre-natal non-existence and post-mortem non-existence have no relevance to us.
Assuming there was turbulence like the Punic wars or there will be disasters like the end
of the world, since we were or will not exist at those times, they are nothing to us.
Therefore, in Parfit’s case, the past and the future involve the existence of the patient;
whereas in Lucretius’ symmetry argument, the past and the future do not involve the
existence of the person. Specifically, this case should be devised to address the past and
the future non-existence. In Rosenbaum’s words:
One’s death (being dead), if a bad at all, is not the sort of bad of which a
person could be aware, and our anxiety bias toward the future is only for
experienced bads, like pain, injury, and other things of which we can
45
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become aware, such as future pain. Therefore, our bias toward the future
is not general enough to include such alleged bads as being dead. 46
Even if we accept that there is a logical connection between our attitudes toward the
near past and the near future and our attitudes toward the pre-natal non-existence and the
post-mortem non-existence, Parfit’s objection is still dubious. There is also a difference
between our attitudes and the justification of those attitudes. As James Warren argues:
Although they may be successful in offering an account of the origin
of the apparently intuitive asymmetrical attitude, they are much less
successful in showing whether and in what way that attitude can be
justified, especially in the case of past and future non-existence. 47
Parfit puts this problem like this:
Whether a pain is in the past or future is a mere difference in its
relation to the present moment. And if it is not irrational to care more
about pains that are in the future, why is it irrational to care more
about pains that are in the nearer future? 48
One might say that the claim that we do not care more about pains that are in the past
can be justified by the fact that we cannot affect the past. Whatever we do now, we
cannot change what has already occurred in the past; whereas our present actions can
affect what will occur in the future. However, this objection might be used to justify my
previous point that past and future experiences are different from past and future nonexistence. This objection relies on the claim that we cannot affect our past experience
whereas what we do now can affect our future experience. Nevertheless, this difference,
if true, can only be used to justify our different attitudes toward past experience and
future experience. On the other hand, our present actions can neither affect our past non-
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existence nor affect our future non-existence. Whatever we do now, we will become
nothing after death. So if anyone thinks that we have different attitudes toward past nonexistence and future non-existence, he has to find another way to justify this difference.
One might say, even if some future suffering is inevitable, even if it cannot be affected
by our present actions, we can still fear it in a different way than the fear of the past.
Parfit provides a prisoner case to illustrate this opinion:
Suppose we are in prison, and will be tortured later today. In such
cases, when we believe that our future suffering is inevitable, our
attitude towards it does not fall into line with our attitude towards
past suffering…we are concerned about these future pains simply
because they are not yet in the past. 49
However, this case can only provide reason for the fear of future pain or suffering.
When it comes to the death issue, it can only justify that it is rational to fear the pain
during the process of dying. But again, if we accept that death leads to annihilation, the
fear of future non-existence still requires further justification.
Chapter 6 Conclusion
It is clear now that Lucretius intends to remove the fear of death by proposing the
symmetry argument, and his effort is quite successful. The symmetry argument has
withstood the test of its criticisms. Closer examination of those criticisms only
strengthens the creativity and coherence of the symmetry argument. According to the
analysis above, both the deprivation approach and the psychology approach fail to defeat
Lucretius’ argument. It seems that both the objection that tries to break the symmetry
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between past non-existence and future non-existence and the objection that tries to break
the symmetry between our attitude toward the past non-existence and our attitude toward
the future non-existence do not work.
However, this doesn’t mean the symmetry argument is exempt from any suspicion.
There is still a little-discussed problem with the symmetry argument. That is, Lucretius
simply presupposes our psychological preference of our present attitudes toward the past
non-existence that we do not fear our past non-existence. 50 To guarantee the soundness of
the symmetry argument, Epicureans have to provide further justification for this premise.
Anyway, Lucretius’ symmetry argument provides a supplemental argument for
Epicurus’ existence argument by aiming to mitigate the fear of the status of being dead;
and the symmetry between pre-natal non-existence and post-mortem non-existence is
quite coherent.
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